Recent state-wide smoking bans are likely the most significant regulations imposed on the casino gaming industry. We explore the effects that the Illinois state smoking ban has had on Illinois casino revenue and attendance as well as casino tax revenue. Our empirical methodology extends and enhances that of previous literature in that we observe a natural experiment in comparing the performance of Illinois casinos with out-of-state casinos (no smoking ban) that share a market with Illinois casinos. Estimates suggest that revenue and admissions at Illinois casinos declined by more than 20 percent ($400 million) and 12 percent, respectively. Calculations reveal that casino tax revenue to state and local governments declined by approximately $200 million.
Introduction
Over the past, decade a growing number of state and local governments have enacted laws that restrict or prohibit smoking in bars, restaurants, and other public places. As of January 2009, fifteen states and 774 city and county jurisdictions across the United States have enacted laws prohibiting smoking in bars, restaurants, and workplaces. Of the local prohibitions against smoking, 593 require smoke-free workplaces and 594 require smoke-free restaurants.
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Proponents of smoking bans cite public health benefits, whereas opponents argue that revenue and employment losses may outweigh the health benefits from a smoking ban. Research on the economic effects (revenue and employment) of smoking bans has revealed a negative effect for some businesses, although the magnitude of the smoking ban effect differs across studies.
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In addition to prohibiting smoking in bars and restaurants, many state and local governments have also enacted smoking bans in gaming establishments. As of January 2009, 15 states have enacted 100 percent smoke-free laws for state-regulated gaming.
with commercial casino gaming, only Colorado and Illinois prohibit smoking in commercial casinos. 4 For several reasons, the policy discussion on prohibiting smoking in casinos has received separate, and arguably sharper, debate than smoking bans in bars and restaurants.
The smoke-free laws in those two states both took effect at the beginning of 2008. 5 First, the marginal contribution of one or two casinos to local employment and tax revenue, most notably in the Midwest and South, is much greater than for a bar or restaurant; in many small communities, one or two casinos employ a large percentage of the population and also provide a large percentage of tax revenue to local communities. 6 Research on the effects of a smoking ban on casino revenue has thus far focused on the state of Delaware, which implemented a smoke-free law in December 2002.
Second, many state and local governments earmark casino revenue to specific programs such as infrastructure and education.
Third, a casino smoking ban is likely to have a greater negative revenue impact on the gaming industry than a smoking ban would have on the restaurant industry because customers patronize casinos for longer time periods than they do restaurants. Finally, the view by some that casino gaming is an immoral activity increases attention to any public policy affecting casino gaming. In the first study on the subject, Mandel, Alamar, and Glantz (2005) found that the smoking ban in Delaware had a negative but statistically insignificant effect on gaming revenue. After correcting for errors in the Mandel, Alamar, and Glantz (2005) study, Pakko (2006) found that the smoking ban in Delaware casinos resulted in a loss of about $6 million, which represented a loss of over 12 5 Points of debate have been summarized from transcripts from floor debate in the Illinois General Assembly prior to passage of the Smoke Free Illinois Act in July of 2007. See http://www.ilga.gov/search/iga_search.asp?scope=sentran95 and search by keywords "smoking ban." 6 For example, contacts at the Casino Queen in East St. Louis, Illinois, report that the city of East St. Louis receives over half of its annual operating revenue from the casino. 7 The three casinos in Delaware are not commercial casinos. They operate as part of the Delaware State Lottery and represent "electronic gaming devices" (slot machines) located at racetracks throughout the state. Casinos operating at racetracks are often called racinos. percent relative to average monthly revenue in the year preceding the smoking ban. In a subsequent study, Pakko (2008a) examined the effect of smoking bans on individual casino revenue in Delaware, finding that casino revenue declined significantly at each of the three Delaware casinos as a result of the smoking ban, with a total revenue effect of approximately 15 percent. Finally, Thalheimer and Ali (2008) estimate a system of slot machine demand equations for the three Delaware casinos. They find that the smoking ban in Delaware reduced gaming demand by nearly 16 percent.
In this paper we extend the economic research on the effect of smoking bans on casino gaming revenue. Our work has several advantages over previous studies on the subject. First, the focus of our analysis is casino gaming in the state of Illinois, the first example of a smoking ban that applies to full-service commercial casinos. Second, we use casino revenue data in adjacent states to help identify the effect of the smoking ban in Illinois and to examine whether there were any revenue spillover effects for casinos located within the same markets but not subject to the smoking ban. This provides for a natural experiment in comparing the performance of Illinois casinos with out-of-state casinos (no smoking ban) that share a market with Illinois casinos. Third, we explore the effect of the Illinois smoking ban on casino admissions as well as casino revenue to generate insight into any difference in the number of patrons versus intensity of casino wagering after the smoking ban. Finally, we conduct several analyses using state-level data, market-level data, and individual casino-level data to assess the impact of the Illinois casino smoking ban on Illinois casinos as well as the casino markets in neighboring states that border Illinois. Our results have implications for the casino industry and the state and local governments that receive a portion of their revenue from casino gaming taxes. The conceptual basis for the hypothesis that a smoking ban will have a negative effect on casino revenue (for those casinos in the smoking ban state) is straightforward: Casino patrons who smoke will chose not to visit the now-smoke-free casino or will gamble less as a result of taking breaks from gambling to go outside the facility to smoke. The effect of the smoking ban will depend on the size of these effects, and the size of each effect is a function of casino patron smoking rates.
Background and Motivation

Riverboat gaming was legalized in Illinois in
A listing of the Illinois casinos used in our analysis, along with descriptive statistics, is provided in Table 1. 14 One key factor in the potential revenue loss from a casino smoking ban is the percentage of gamblers who smoke. Those in the casino industry argue that a smoking ban will unfairly hurt their industry because casino patrons have a higher smoking rate than that of the general By examining both casino revenue and casino admissions, we provide insights into whether fewer patrons visited the Illinois casinos after the ban or whether wagering by the same number of patrons is less (thus suggesting no substitution with area casinos but rather lessintense wagering). 11 We treat the Majestic I and Majestic II-two casinos in Gary, Indiana, sharing a common admissions gate-as one casino location. 12 The Quad Cities include Davenport (Iowa), Moline (Illinois), Rock Island (Illinois), and Bettendorf (Iowa). 13 Data from the Lumiere Place casino, which opened in December 2007, is treated separately from those of the preexisting casinos in the St. Louis market. 14 We assume that the smoking ban will not induce a significant number of people to begin gambling as a result of the ban.
population. This premise is included in the work of Pritsos, Pritsos, and Spears (2008 20 The regressions each include a constant, a trend, and a trend-squared term. To account for seasonality, a full array of seasonal dummies is also included in each regression (coefficients not reported). The residuals of the regressions are modeled to include an AR(1) term. Standard errors for all regressions are calculated using the heteroskedasticity/autocorrelation adjustment procedure of Newey and West (1987) .
Empirical Results: State-Level Analysis
The results for statewide totals of AGR are shown in Table 2 . The regressions achieve a reasonable fit to the data, with each of the state-specific policy variables displaying a statistically 17 Monthly snowfall totals were obtained from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The data are measured in inches, represented as deviations from "normal" (1971-2000 averages) . For the four states, snowfall data were collected for a representative centrally located city: Illinois-Urbana, IndianaIndianapolis, Missouri-Columbia, and Iowa-Quad Cities (Moline, IL). 18 Prior to July 1999, riverboats took excursions that limited admittance to specific cruise departure times. After that date, the boats were allowed to remain permanently docked, with continuous open boarding. 19 Although the tax changes did not affect customers directly, the response of casino operators was to cut back on expenses and to lower win-ratios. The effect of these responses had a demonstrable effect on both attendance and revenues. See Mellen (2003) . 20 Continuous boarding was allowed for St. Louis area riverboats in September 1999, with the policy extended across the rest of the state in November. To account for this phase-in, the variable SepNov99 takes a value of 0.5 for September and October and a value of 1.0 thereafter. Results for regressions using the natural logarithm of total admissions as the dependent variable are reported in Table 3 . The coefficient on the smoking ban dummy variable for Illinois is negative and statistically significant, although the magnitude of the decline is considerably smaller than found for AGR. For admissions, the smoking ban dummy is associated with mixed changes in the other states; however, the point estimates are small and not statistically significant.
Coefficients on the smoking ban dummy variable for revenue in surrounding states are all positive. However, the point estimates are small and not statistically significant. Hence, there is no clear evidence that the losses at Illinois casinos are associated with revenue increases in nearby states.
22
The statistically significant declines in statewide admissions and revenue in Illinois suggest that the smoking ban affected demand for casino gaming along both extensive and intensive margins. These findings are consistent with the survey results of Petry and Oncken (2002) , which suggests that smoking patrons visit casinos more often and wager more money.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that smoking patrons continued to visit the casinos, but perhaps did not visit as often, stay as long, or wager as much as they did before the ban. To further investigate this proposition, and to evaluate more carefully the possibility of demand 21 The conversion of regression coefficients to percentage changes uses the formula exp(γ)-1 (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980 The first column of Table 4 shows the results for revenue (AGR). The impact of the smoking ban on Chicago area AGR is remarkably uniform, with each showing losses of over 20 percent. For casinos outside the Chicago area, the revenue losses range from less than 10 percent to nearly 30 percent. In every case, however, the coefficients from the AGR regressions are negative and statistically significant.
The second column of Table 4 reports the findings when total admissions is used as the dependent variable. A comparison of these estimates with those found for revenue highlights the importance of extensive versus intensive changes in demand. In some cases, admissions declined by magnitudes similar to the fall in revenue (e.g., the Empress casino in Joliet). In other 23 The casino in Rock Island opened a new, expanded facility in December 2008, resulting in a one-month surge in attendance and revenues at the end of the sample period. To account for this event, regressions for Rock Island (and other casinos in the Quad Cities market) were estimated using data through Tables 2 and 3 .
Before examining regional markets more closely, it is worth noting that the one casino that seems least affected by the smoking ban is the one that faces the least competition -the Par-A-Dice casino in Peoria. Its location in the center of the state sets it approximately 90 miles from the nearest competition. 
Chicago Market
The largest casino market is the Chicago area market. In addition to the four casinos in The clear differences between the Indiana casinos and the Illinois casinos in the Chicago area market are summarized in the last two rows of Table 5 . The four casinos in Illinois show a revenue decline of approximately 20 percent after the smoking ban implementation, whereas the Indiana casinos show no significant decline in revenues as a result of the Illinois smoking ban.
Admissions figures show a decline of about 13 percent in Illinois, compared to a decline of 3 percent at the Indiana casinos. 27 The Majestic Star casinos in Gary Indiana are two separate gaming floors that share a common admission gate. For the purposes of this analysis, the revenues of these two casinos are combined. 28 The full regression results -reported in the Appendix -include the July 1999 and July 2003 dates in order to evaluate the prevalence of cross-border spillovers from policy changes in Illinois. There is little evidence of such spillover effects from these events, suggesting that it is not surprising for the smoking ban to show no significant, measurable effects on the nearby Indiana casinos. The regressions summarized in Table 5 In Table 6 , the dummy variable for the Illinois smoking ban is associated with negative responses at each of the non-Illinois casinos, for both AGR and admissions. In the case of Caruthersville, both declines are statistically significant. These findings suggest that the regression model might not be capturing the effect of an overall slowdown in local market conditions, with the smoking ban dummy variable picking up some of that effect. Indeed, in the final row of Table 6 , regressions for the sum of the two non-Illinois casinos display declines. In the case of the admissions regression, the downturn is clearly significant. If the dummy variable is overstating the revenue impact of the smoking ban for the Metropolis casino by over 6 percent, and overstating the impact on admissions by over 10 percent, that still leaves a relative decline of over 20 percent for AGR and about 8 percent for admissions-broadly consistent with the results for the Chicago market.
Quad Cities Market
In the northwest corner of Illinois, Jumer's Casino in Rock Island faces an array of competitors across the Mississippi river in Iowa. Table 7 compares the experience of Rock
Island with its four nearest competitors.
The first row of Table 7 shows the coefficient estimates for Rock Island, which suggest losses of about 10 percent for revenue (statistically significant) and 5 percent for admissions (not significant For the regressions using total admissions, two of the four Iowa casinos show statistically significant effects associated with the smoking ban dummy variable. Despite the large increase in revenue at Catfish Bend, admissions were down by about 7 percent. In contrast, admissions at the casino in Bettendorf show a statistically significant increase of 6 percent associated with the smoking ban. For the regression using admission totals for the four Iowa casinos combined, the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant.
St. Louis Market
The final market to consider is the St. Louis area market. This market includes two casinos on the Illinois side of the Mississippi river: the Argosy in Alton and the Casino Queen in East St. Louis. The regressions in Table 4 show that these two venues experienced losses of over 25 percent in revenue and between 15 and 20 percent declines in attendance. However, the situation in the St. Louis market is complicated by the opening of a new casino and hotel in St.
Louis city, the Lumiere Place Casino, which opened in mid-December 2007. The timing of its opening -coinciding so closely to the implementation of the Illinois smoking ban -makes it nearly impossible to disentangle the effects with certainty. Nevertheless, careful analysis can yield some findings that are at least suggestive. shows a revenue loss of nearly 20 percent associated with the smoking ban. On the other hand, the regression for Harrah's in Maryland Heights shows a small, positive point-estimate for the smoking ban dummy (although it is not statistically significant). The fourth and fifth rows in Table 8 The final two rows of Table 8 indicate the impact that Lumiere Place had on revenue and admissions for the St. Louis market as a whole. Not including Lumiere's revenue, AGR in the St.
Louis market was down by 14 percent as a result of the smoking ban. When Lumiere's revenue is included, the coefficient on the smoking ban dummy is slightly positive but not significant.
For admissions, a negative coefficient for the total without including Lumiere is significant, but when Lumiere's attendance is added to the total, the coefficient is positive and significant. We can conclude that overall, casino revenue in the St. Louis market was consistent with no unusual aggregate changes in revenue in 2008, but with an increase in overall casino attendance that is likely associated with the novelty of a new casino.
If we assume (somewhat simplistically) that the opening of Lumiere Place had the same impact on all other casinos in the market, the relatively poorer performance of the Illinois casinos still leaves room for the conclusion of a significant impact of the smoking ban. However, it is unlikely that the opening of a new competitor affected all other casinos in the market identically.
Indeed, evidence from the Chicago market suggests that geographic proximity is an important determinant of competitive impact.
The results in Table 8 
Interpreting the Regional Market Estimates
The exercise of estimating the impact of the Illinois smoke-free law on individual casinos and comparing those estimates with the experience of nearby out-of-state competitors can be interpreted as a robustness check on our results for total statewide revenue and attendance. To the extent that local economic conditions or other exogenous factors affect our measurement of the smoking ban's effect, some adjustment to our raw estimates might be in order. Table 6 ) is -0.3344 -(-0.0666) = -0.2678, or -23.5 percent. This "difference in differences" calculation provides an alternative set of estimates for the statewide impact of the smoking ban.
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The results for the Chicago-area market are the most straightforward to interpret. Each of the four Illinois casinos in the Chicago area suffered revenue losses of more than 20 percent.
The corresponding estimates for competing casinos in Indiana show only small changes that are not generally significant. Similarly, our estimates of the smoking ban's impact on total 29 The specific coefficients used for these comparisons are those reported in Table 5 , line 5 (Chicago); Table 6 , line 4 (Southern Illinois); Table 7 , line 6 (Quad Cities); and attendance at Chicago area casinos shows a downturn of more than 13 percent, while the coefficient estimates for Indiana casinos in that market shows a downturn of only 3 percent. In terms of relative performance, total attendance at the Illinois casinos was down 9 percent compared with out-of-state competitors.
In the southern Illinois market, we found downturns in both revenue and attendance that were among the largest in the state. However, we also found that the smokefree dummy variable picked up negative effects for casinos in Indiana and Missouri as well. This suggests the possibility that there is some additional factor missing from the analysis or that our regression specification is not fully accounting for the impact of the economic downturn on casinos in this market. Specifically, our estimates show revenue at the Metropolis casino was down by 28 percent while revenue at out-of-state casinos was down by 6 percent. Hence, in terms of relative performance, we might temper our estimate of revenue losses to be about 22 percent. A similar comparison for admissions indicates that the 19 percent loss at the Illinois casino, considered alongside a 10 percent decline in attendance at out-of-state casinos, yields a measure of relative performance of approximately -9 percent.
In the Iowa market, we found significant positive effects associated with the smokefree dummy variable. This might indicate that the casinos on the Iowa side of the river benefited from the patronage of customers who chose not to attend the casino in Rock Island after the smoking ban; or it might indicate that there was a general upturn in demand within this particular market, but that the Rock Island casino did not share in the increase. Whatever the interpretation, the revenue decline of over 10 percent in Illinois contrasts with a revenue increase of more than 14 percent in Iowa, yielding a measure of relative performance amounting to -25 percent. In this market, coefficient estimates for the admissions regressions were not generally significant, but a comparison of coefficient point estimates yields a measure of relative performance equal to nearly -8 percent.
Finally, in the St. Louis market, one factor influencing revenue that is difficult to disentangle from the smoking ban is the opening of a new casino in downtown St. Louis. This factor most certainly has an impact on the magnitude of our coefficient estimates. As a whole, the three pre-existing casinos on the Missouri side of the river suffered revenue declines of about 10 percent after January 2008, compared with declines of over 26 percent in the Illinois casinos in this market. The difference-in-differences effect is about -16 percent. For total admissions, the Illinois casinos were down 16 percent and the three Missouri casinos were down by over 7 percent, leaving a relative difference of nearly -9 percent.
When the coefficients for Illinois casinos are adjusted for market conditions measured for nearby out-of-state competitors, the results become more uniform across the state. In terms of relative performance, revenue was down by approximately 20 percent and total admissions were down by about 10 percent. These estimates are consistent with the results in Tables 2 and 3 for statewide totals. In fact, summing over the results for each of the nine casinos provides alternative estimates that are quite close to the results reported in Table 2 
Impact on Casino Tax Revenue
Given the estimates reported above, the evidence suggests that the Illinois smoking ban has been associated with declining attendance and falling revenue at Illinois riverboat casinos.
For policymakers, a key question that arises from this analysis involves the impact on tax revenue.
The state of Illinois imposes both a per capita admission tax and a proportionate wagering tax on riverboat casinos. The admissions tax is set at $3 per person for patrons of Casino Rock
Island and $2 per person for the other eight casinos. From each admission, $1 goes to the host community where a riverboat gaming operation is located and the remainder goes to the state.
The wagering tax is set on a graduated scale, as a percent of AGR. The tax rates are reported in Table 10 .
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Using our estimated effects on revenue and admissions at the Illinois casinos, Tables 11A   and 11B show the casino tax revenue impact of the smoking ban for both state and local governments. In Table 11A , using the unadjusted estimated coefficients reported in Table 4 , we find total tax revenue declines of $208 million. Of this total, the state lost $195.5 million, while local communities collectively suffered revenue losses of $12.4 million. Table 11B uses the market-adjusted coefficients. Tax revenue losses are slightly smaller using this calculation:
Total revenues were down by $194.8 million, with the state's share of that loss $183.7 million and the local communities' share equal to approximately $11.1 million.
Each local government that serves as a host community for a casino licensee receives a share in an amount equal to 5 percent of AGR, with the remainder of the progressive tax revenue going to the state.
31 30 The present tax structure has been in effect since July 1, 2005 (Illinois Gaming Board, Annual Report, 2008 . 31 These figures represent only the loss in gaming tax revenue and admissions tax revenue. Total tax revenue losses to the state and local governments may be less if consumers substitute away from casino gambling into other taxable activities.
Summary and Conclusions
A growing number of state and local government have passed laws that ban smoking in public places, including casinos. Prohibiting smoking in casinos -if such smoking bans reduce casino revenue -serves as an opposing public policy to the legalization of casino gaming as a mean of generating revenue. These opposing policies, along with health-related aspects of smoking, are the primary points of debate in policy discussions regarding smoking bans and, as a result, have attracted the attention of researchers interested in estimating the potential revenue effects of smoking bans.
Our work extends and improves upon previous studies that have explored the revenue effects of smoking bans in two key ways. First, we consider the effect of the smoking ban on both revenue and attendance to provide new insight into the intensity of wagering and casino patronage after the smoking ban. Second, and more importantly, we conduct a natural experiment by comparing the performance of casinos in a smoking-ban state with out-of-state casinos with no smoking ban that all share a common casino market. This natural experiment provides for a more effective test of the impact of smoking bans than simply analyzing casinos directly impacted by the smoking ban and, we argue, should be considered in future research on the economic effects of smoking bans.
Our results indicate that Illinois casinos suffered losses of more than 20 percent -well over $400 million -in total during the first year of the Smoke Free Illinois Act. Some of this loss appears to be associated with casino patrons gambling less when they do attend the casinos, and part of the loss is also evident in declining attendance. We find that the impact of the smoking ban on total admissions amounts to around 10 percent, with our point estimates indicating a downturn in the range of 9 to 13 percent. These estimates imply total casino tax revenue was lower by roughly $200 million.
The economic effects of the Smoke Free Illinois Act-specifically with regard to casino revenue and government tax receipts-represent only part of the Act's overall impact. In a full analysis, these effects need to be considered alongside costs and benefits, including the public health benefits of the legislation. Jumer's -Rock 614, 505, 045 Argosy - 333, 978, 640 Casino Queen -E. St. 241, 960, 519 Total for 191, 285, 168, 515, 648 Estimates from Statewide 669, 045, 376 Note: Estimates for unadjusted coefficients are based on the results reported in Table 4 . Estimates for the "relative to market" columns use the differences in the smoking ban coefficient for the casino and the smoking ban coefficient for each casino's respective out-of-state market, as reported in Tables 5 through 8 . Argosy 718, 922, 766, 356, 257, 846, 351, 176, 168, 201, 520, 378, 184 Total by 528, 370, 898, 600 Note: Predicted values from Table 4 were used to compute AGR and admissions with and without a smoking ban. The AGR tax rates (Table 10) were then used to compute the revenue gain or loss from the smoking ban. Per Illinois law, we allocated 95 percent of the gain or loss in AGR tax revenue to the state and 5 percent to the home dock community. There is a $2 admissions tax, half of which goes to the state and half to the home dock. The exception is Rock Island where there is a $3 admissions tax, with $1 going to the state and $2 to the home dock. Harrah 197, 115, 640, 558, 581, 451, 716, 586, 824, 306, 535 5, 343 5, 818, 301, 646, 770, 604, 651, 527 Alton 473, 579, 951, 251, 244, 141, 586, 515, 562, 657, 149, 095 Total by 728, 078, 806, 387 Note: Predicted values from Table 4 were used to compute AGR and admissions with and without a smoking ban.
The predicted values for 2008 where then adjusted using the differences in the smoking ban coefficient for the casino and the smoking ban coefficient for each casino's respective out-of-state market (from Tables 5-8 ). The AGR tax rates (Table 10) were then used to compute the revenue gain or loss from the smoking ban. Per Illinois law, we allocated 95 percent of the gain or loss in AGR tax revenue to the state and 5 percent to the home dock community. There is a $2 admissions tax, half of which goes to the state and half to the home dock. The exception is Rock Island where there is a $3 admissions tax, with $1 going to the state and $2 to the home dock.
